

# **EXHIBIT 1**

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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
SOUTHERN DIVISION**

**ACACIA MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES  
CORPORATION,**

**Plaintiff,**

VS.

NEW DESTINY INTERNET GROUP,  
et. al..

## Defendants.

Case No. SACV 02-1040 JW (MLGx)

### Consolidated Cases:

SA CV 02-1048-JW (MLGx)  
SA CV 02-1063-JW (MLGx)  
SA CV 02-1165-JW (MLGx)  
SA CV 03-0217-JW (MLGx)  
SA CV 03-0218-JW (MLGx)  
SA CV 03-0219-JW (MLGx)  
SA CV 03-0259-JW (MLGx)  
SA CV 03-0271-JW (MLGx)  
SA CV 03-0308-JW (MLGx)

### **Related Cases:**

SA CV 03-1610-JW (MLGX)  
SA CV 03-1800-JW (MLGX)  
SA CV 03-1801-JW (MLGX)  
SA CV 03-1803-JW (MLGX)  
SA CV 03-1804-JW (MLGX)  
SA CV 03-1805-JW (MLGX)  
SA CV 03-1807-JW (MLGX)

**PLAINTIFF ACACIA MEDIA  
TECHNOLOGIES  
CORPORATION'S OPPOSITION  
TO DEFENDANTS' CLAIM  
CONSTRUCTION BRIEF RE:  
CLAIM TERMS IN THE '702  
PATENT**

DATE: May 19, 2004

DATE: May 19, 2001  
TIME: 9:00 a.m.

CTRM: Hon. James Ware

AND ALL RELATED CASE ACTIONS.

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1      **I. INTRODUCTION**

2      Acacia hereby provides its opposition to defendants' proposed claim  
3      constructions for the terms in the '702 patent.

4      Defendants' proposed claim constructions are erroneous for many reasons—too  
5      many to fully address in this introduction. Most notable of defendants' errors relates  
6      to the terms "identification encoder" and "sequence encoder." These terms connote  
7      structure, as a matter of law, and therefore these terms are not construed as means-  
8      plus-function claims. This cannot be disputed. The Federal Circuit in Personalized  
9      Media (a case relied on by defendants) held that a very similar claim term—"digital  
10     detector"—connotes structure and therefore that claim term cannot be construed as a  
11     means-plus-function term. Personalized Media supports Acacia's position.  
12     Defendants have not met their burden of proving invalidity of the claims of the '702  
13     patent by clear and convincing evidence.

14     Each of defendants' proposed constructions invite the Court to commit legal  
15     error. The Court should not accept defendants' invitation; it should adopt the  
16     constructions proposed by Acacia in its briefs.

17      **II. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ADOPT DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED**  
18      **CONSTRUCTIONS**

19      **A.    "A Transmission System At A First Location In Data**

20      **Communication With A Reception System At A Second Location"**

21      Acacia construes this phrase as:

22      at least one transmission system, i.e., an assembly of elements,  
23      such as people, machines, and/or methods, capable of functioning  
24      together to transmit signals wherein the transmission system may  
25      be located at one facility or may be spread over a plurality of  
26      facilities, and at least one reception system, i.e., an assembly of  
27      elements, such as people, machines, and/or methods, capable of  
28      functioning together to receive signals, wherein the transmission

1 system(s) and reception system(s) are at different locations and  
2 wherein encoded information may move between the transmission  
3 and reception system(s) by means of communication techniques.

4 Defendants construe this phrase as: "an assembly of elements, located at a  
5 single first premises, that function together to transmit electrical signals to an  
6 assembly of elements, located at a second single premises, that function together to  
7 receive the transmitted electrical signals, when the transmitting assembly of elements  
8 and the receiving assembly of elements are connected so that electrical signals may be  
9 transferred between them." Acacia has set forth below each instance where Acacia  
10 and Defendants disagree as to terms within this phrase, and explain why Acacia's  
11 proffered construction is the legally correct construction.

12 **1. The word "system" should be construed as "an assembly of  
13 elements, such as people, machines, and/or methods," and not  
14 simply as "an assembly of elements."**

15 Although both Acacia and Defendants construe "systems" as an "assembly of  
16 elements," the inclusive meaning of "elements," consistent with the patent  
17 specification and relevant dictionary definitions should be used. Without explaining  
18 in a jury instruction that system "elements" can include "people, machines, and/or  
19 methods," Acacia justifiably fears that its patent claims will not be construed to the  
20 full scope of its invention.

21 The Federal Circuit requires that courts give a claim term the full range of its  
22 ordinary meaning. Rexnord Corp. v. The Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed.  
23 Cir. 2001) ("In addition, unless compelled to do otherwise, a court will give a claim  
24 term the full range of its ordinary meaning as understood by an artisan of ordinary  
25 skill.") Here, the full range of the ordinary meaning of the phrase "transmission  
26 system" and "reception system" includes the fact that the elements of the system may  
27 include people, machines, and methods. This ordinary meaning is found in the IEEE  
28 Dictionary in the definition of the term "system." It should be included together with

1 the IEEE Dictionary definition of “transmission system.” Texas Digital Systems, Inc.  
2 v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“If more than one dictionary  
3 definition is consistent with the use of the words in the intrinsic record, the claim  
4 terms may be construed to encompass all such consistent meanings.”)

5 The fact that the transmission system (and the reception system, which in the  
6 context of this claim phrase is the reciprocal of the transmission system<sup>1</sup>) may include  
7 people, machines, and methods in the system is consistent with the specification of  
8 the ‘702 patent. (‘702 patent, 8:29-32; 10:36-39; 10:59-63; and 14:13-26).

9 **2. The phrase “a transmission system at a first location” should  
10 be construed as a transmission system located at one facility or  
11 a plurality of facilities, not located “at a single, first premises,”  
12 as Defendants contend.**

13 The ‘702 patent specification states that the transmission system may either be  
14 located in one facility or may be spread over a plurality of facilities. (‘702 patent,  
15 5:58-60). This feature of the transmission system should be included in the  
16 construction of the phrase “transmission system,” because it is the system that is  
17 described by the inventors in the ‘702 patent. If the Court were not to include the fact  
18 that the transmission system may be located in more than one facility, then the  
19 construction could be interpreted to exclude transmission systems located in multiple  
20 facilities. Such a construction would be improper, because it would be inconsistent  
21 with the inventors’ disclosure of the transmission system in the ‘702 patent. Masco  
22 Corp. v. U.S., 303 F.3d 1316, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Masco’s proposed definition of  
23 ‘drive’ to encompass pulling actions is inconsistent with the specification of the ‘068  
24 patent and with the prosecution history of the ‘068 patent and its parent patent.”)  
25 Defendants’ improperly ignore this described feature of the transmission system in  
26 their construction of the phrase “transmission system.”

27  
28 <sup>1</sup> Defendants state that the reception system is the reciprocal of the transmission  
system. (Defendants’ Opening Brief at 9:2-4).

1        The claim language, even though it states “a transmission system at a first  
2 location,” is consistent with a single location being geographically broad enough to  
3 encompass a plurality of facilities. It is clear from the context of the words of claims  
4 1, 17 and 27 that the limitation “at a first location” is used in contradiction to the  
5 “reception system at a second location.” So long as no elements of the transmission  
6 system are at the location of the reception system, the location elements of the claim  
7 would be met.

8        The arguments asserted by Defendants for a contrary construction rely on two  
9 incorrect legal arguments: (1) that the terms “a first location” and “a second location”  
10 “must be construed to mean a single location” (Defendants’ Opening Brief at 10:28-  
11 11:1); and (2) that the inventors intended the term “location” to mean a “premises,”  
12 because they had made such a statement in a prior related patent. Because neither  
13 argument is correct, defendants’ proposed construction must fail.

14       Notably, Defendants’ legal arguments in its opening brief are contradicted by  
15 their original construction of “a first location” and “a second location” in their  
16 discovery responses. In their discovery responses, defendants did not contend that the  
17 first and second locations each means a single location, nor did they contend that the  
18 term “location” means a premises, rather than location. Instead, defendants contended  
19 that “[t]he transmission system and the reception system must be at different  
20 locations.” (Exhibit 13 at p. 124 to Block Decl.) Acacia agreed with this  
21 construction, and therefore Acacia adopted defendants’ construction in its  
22 supplemental claim constructions, which the parties exchanged on May 4, 2004, and  
23 in its claim construction brief.<sup>2</sup> (Exhibit 15 to Block Decl.).

24  
25       <sup>2</sup> Acacia’s original construction, which defendants had in their possession when  
26 defendants made their original construction, was very similar to defendants’ original  
27 construction. Acacia contended that the first and second locations were not absolute  
28 locations, but rather locations that were relative to one another. Thus, the term “first  
location” means anywhere other than the second location and the term “second  
location” means anywhere other than the first location. (Exhibit 22 to Block Supp.  
Decl.)

a) **The Article “A” in the Phrases “A First Location” And “A Second Location” Is Legally Construed To Mean “One Or More Than One”**

Defendants' contention that the terms "a first location" and "a second location" each "must be construed to mean a single location" is incorrect as a matter of law. This construction is inconsistent with the specification of the '702 patent, which states that the transmission system may be located in one or more facilities. ('702 patent, 5:57-60).

All of the claims of the '702 patent use the open ended transitional term "comprising"<sup>3</sup> in its preamble:

**“1. A communication system comprising:**

a transmission system at a first location in data

communication with a reception system at a second

location.”

(Claim 1 of the '702 patent; emphasis added).

The Federal Circuit has held that, the articles “a” or “an” mean “one or more than one,” in claims which use the open ended transitional term “comprising.” Elkay Mfg. Co. v. Ebco Mfg. Co., 192 F.3d 973, 977 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“While the article ‘a’ or ‘an’ may suggest ‘one,’ our cases emphasize that ‘a’ or ‘an’ can mean ‘one’ or ‘more than one,’ depending on the context in which the article is used.... The asserted claims, however, use the open term ‘comprising’ in their transition phrases. We therefore hold that the plain meaning of ‘an upstanding feed tube ... to provide a hygienic flow path for delivering liquid from ... and for admitting air ... into said container’ is not necessarily limited to a single feed tube with a single flow path for both liquid and air.”); Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir.

<sup>3</sup> The transitional term “comprising” is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim. Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

1 1997) ("The article 'a' suggests a single chamber. However, patent claim parlance  
2 also recognizes that an article can carry the meaning of 'one or more,' for example in  
3 a claim using the transitional phrase 'comprising.'") citing, North American Vaccine,  
4 Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1575-76 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

5 Here, because the claims use the transitional phrase "comprising" and because  
6 the article "a" appears in the phrases "a first location" and "a second location," these  
7 phrases must be construed to mean: "one or more than one first location" and "one or  
8 more than one second location."<sup>4</sup>

9 Defendants are therefore wrong to argue that these phrases "must be construed  
10 to mean a single location." This proposition is not supported by Federal Circuit law  
11 under the facts of this case. Defendants cite no case which supports its position and  
12 there is clear, controlling Federal Circuit precedent to the contrary.

13 Thus, the phrases "a first location" and "a second location" are construed to  
14 mean "one or more first location" and "one or more second location."

15 b) **The Inventors Statements Made During Prosecution Of**  
16 **The '720 Patent Regarding "Premises" Have No Effect**  
17 **On The Claims Of The '702 Patent**

18 Defendants discuss the prosecution history of the related U.S. Patent No.  
19 6,002,720 (the '720 patent) and argue that the term "location" in the claims of the  
20 '702 patent must be interpreted to mean "premises." Defendants fail to inform the  
21 Court that the claims that were at issue in the '720 patent claimed a different system.  
22 The term "location" used in the claims of the '720 patent during its prosecution does  
23 not refer to the location of the transmission system or the reception system. Rather it  
24 refers to the location selected by the user who is accessing the system, to which the  
25 information is to be delivered.

26 \_\_\_\_\_  
27 <sup>4</sup> See, 3M Innovative Products Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 350 F.3d 1365,  
28 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("The use of the terms 'first' and 'second' is a common patent-  
law convention to distinguish between repeated instances of an element or  
limitation.").

1        The discussion of the term “location” in the ‘720 patent file history related only  
2 to pending claims 43 and 44. (See, Exhibit HH at pp. 435; 439-440 to Miller Decl.).  
3        Claim 43 states: “[a] transmission system responsive to input from a user positioned  
4 at an accessing location for transmitting information to premises selected by the user,  
5 the transmission system comprising …” The discussion of the prior art and the  
6 statement by the inventors relating to locations and premises related to the place to  
7 which information will be transmitted when that place may be other than the place  
8 where the user accesses or requests the information. (Exhibit HH at pp. 435; 439-440  
9 to Miller Decl.). Because the ‘720 patent refers to a different claim limitation  
10 (position of a user accessing the transmission system) than that which is being  
11 construed in the ‘702 patent (locations of the transmission and reception system), the  
12 Court cannot consider this portion of the ‘720 patent file history in construing terms in  
13 different limitations in the ‘702 patent claims. See, Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced  
14 Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., 248 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“However, none  
15 of the claims of the ‘732 patent contain the same limitation that we are construing  
16 from the ‘727 patent. Accordingly, we decline Medtronic’s invitation to consider the  
17 ‘732 patent’s prosecution history for the purpose of construing the limitation in  
18 question.”)

19        The Court should therefore not construe the term “location” to be “premises.”

20                    **3. Defendants’ Proposed Construction Of “Data**

21                    **Communication” Is Erroneous, Because It Deviates From The**  
22                    **Ordinary Meaning Of This Phrase**

23        Defendants’ proposed construction of “data communication” is erroneous,  
24 because it is not the ordinary meaning of the phrase and there is no basis in the  
25 specification for deviating from the ordinary meaning.

26        In their brief, defendants note that the IEEE Dictionary provide two definitions  
27 for data communication: (1) the movement of encoded information by means of  
28 communication techniques; and (2) a data transfer between data source and data

1 destination via one or more data links. (Defendants' Opening Brief at 9:17-22). In  
2 their discovery responses Defendants had embraced the first IEEE Dictionary  
3 definition, but now Defendants dismissively argue that "the definitions are not  
4 particularly useful."<sup>5</sup> Instead, defendants contrive their own definition, a definition  
5 which defendants do not support with a dictionary, or with the specification or file  
6 history of the '702 patent. That defendants seemingly find their own fanciful  
7 definition, apparently totally imagined by defendants, more "useful" provides no basis  
8 whatsoever for adopting defendants construction.

9 There is a heavy presumption that claim terms take on their ordinary meaning.  
10 CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  
11 Defendants cannot overcome this heavy presumption with cavalier statements that the  
12 ordinary meaning is "not particularly useful." Defendants have not justified their  
13 deviation from the ordinary meaning of data communication as set forth in the IEEE  
14 Dictionary and which they originally embraced.

15 Thus, the phrase "data communication" is construed consistent with its ordinary  
16 meaning to mean "the movement of encoded information by means of  
17 communications techniques."

20

---

21       <sup>5</sup> In their original discovery responses, defendants proposed that "data  
22 communication" be construed in accordance with the first definition in the IEEE  
23 Dictionary as "the movement of encoded information by means of communications  
24 techniques." (Exhibit 11 at p. 101 to Block Decl.). For the majority of this case,  
25 defendants found the IEEE Dictionary definition to be satisfactory. This was even  
26 after defendants were able to consider Acacia's construction, which included the two  
27 IEEE Dictionary definitions now abandoned by defendants.

28 The parties agreed to supplement their discovery constructions by exchanging  
29 supplemental constructions on May 4, 2004. In reliance on defendants' construction  
30 of "data communications" and in an effort to reduce the number of disputes between  
31 the parties over the construction of claim terms, Acacia supplemented its construction  
32 of "data communication" by adopting the construction proposed by defendants.  
33 (Exhibit 15 to Block Decl.). Meanwhile, at the same time, defendants changed their  
34 construction to deviate from the ordinary meaning they originally embraced to a new,  
35 unsupported definition.

**B. Defendants' Indefiniteness Arguments Regarding The Terms  
"Sequence Encoder And "Identification Encoder" Fail As A Matter  
Of Law**

4 Defendants' contend that the terms "sequence encoder" and "identification  
5 encoder" are indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. Defendants argue that these terms  
6 are both "functional" terms and therefore do not connote any structure. As a result,  
7 according to defendants, the "identification encoder" term should be construed as  
8 means-plus-function claim terms under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. Defendants argue that  
9 the specification does not contain sufficient corresponding structure for the  
10 "identification encoder," making the identification encoder term indefinite.

11 With respect to “sequence encoder,” defendants, in a lengthy discussion of  
12 prior art references, conclude that no function for the “functional” term “sequence  
13 encoder” is recited in claims 1 and 17, and therefore § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply to the  
14 “sequence encoder” term. Nevertheless, without explanation, defendants conclude  
15 that the “sequence encoder” term is also indefinite.

16 Defendants' arguments are without merit. Defendants' reliance on  
17 Personalized Media Communications, L.L.C. v. International Trade Commission, 161  
18 F.3d 696 (Fed. Cir. 1998) is misplaced. As discussed below, Personalized Media held  
19 that a claim term very similar to the terms at issue here—"digital detector"—  
20 comprised structure and therefore, as a matter of law, could not be construed as a  
21 means-plus-function claim term. The Federal Circuit also held the term to be definite.  
22 Rather than supporting defendants' position, Personalized Media actually supports  
23 Acacia's position that these terms themselves connote sufficient structure. The  
24 Federal Circuit's decision in Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580  
25 (Fed. Cir. 1996) is also on point, because, in that case, the court held that even claim  
26 terms defined in functional terms are sufficient structure to avoid application of § 112,  
27 ¶ 6.

1 In considering these indefiniteness issues, the Court must be mindful that  
2 defendants are seeking to invalidate the claims of the '702 patent. The claims of the  
3 '702 patent are presumed valid and defendants can only overcome this presumption  
4 with clear and convincing evidence, which they have not done. Intellectual Property  
5 Development, Inc. v. UA-Columbia Cablevision of Westchester, Inc., 336 F.3d 1308,  
6 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

7        Further, the issue of indefiniteness is determined by what is understood by  
8 persons skilled in the art when reading the claims in light of the specification. Atmel  
9 Corp. v. Information Storage Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  
10 Defendants ignore this standard in their brief, and, in fact, attempt to mislead the  
11 Court by arguing that “whether or not defendants present testimony from an expert in  
12 claim construction issues has no bearing on the Court’s ability to make the legal  
13 determination of whether a claim satisfies § 112, ¶ 2 by providing sufficient  
14 structure.” (Defendants’ Opening Brief, at 6:27 - 7:1). Defendants invite legal error  
15 by instructing the Court to determine issues of indefiniteness without even  
16 considering expert testimony. Atmel 198 F.3d at 1380 (court erred by failing to  
17 assess indefiniteness based on the understanding of one skilled in the art.)

## 1. The Terms “Sequence Encoder” And “Identification Encoder” Connote Structure

20 The Federal Circuit in Personalized Media held a claim term, “digital detector,”  
21 is sufficient structure to avoid § 112, ¶ 6 treatment. The claim term was held to be  
22 definite.

23 In Personalized Media, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) (this case was  
24 on appeal from the International Trade Commission) held that the “digital detector”<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> In the claims at issue in Personalized Media, the phrases were: (1) "a digital detector for receiving said transmission and detecting said predetermined signal in said transmission based on either a specific location or a specific time;" and (2) "a digital detector for receiving at least some information of said transmission and detecting said specific signal at a specific location or time." Personalized Media, 161 F.3d at 698-99.

1 in the claims was construed as a means-plus-function claim term under § 112, ¶ 6 and  
2 found that the specification lacked a specific structure for the digital detector, because  
3 the specification described the digital detector in functional terms. Personalized  
4 Media, 161 F.3d at 700. The ALJ thus held the term “digital detector” to be indefinite  
5 and thus held the claims to be indefinite. Id. at 700-01.

6 The Federal Circuit reversed the ALJ, finding that the term “digital detector”  
7 communicates sufficient structure. The court only had to look to dictionary  
8 definitions of “detector” to determine that the term “detector” had a well-known  
9 meaning as being structure to those of skill in the electrical arts:

10 The “digital detector” limitation does not use the word “means,”  
11 and therefore this limitation is presumed not to invoke § 112, ¶ 6.

12 Neither intrinsic nor extrinsic evidence rebuts this presumption  
13 because the term “detector” is a sufficient recitation of structure.

14 “Detector” is not a generic structural term such as “means,”  
15 “element,” or “device”; nor is it a coined term lacking a clear  
16 meaning, such as “widget” or “ram-a-fram.” Instead, as noted by  
17 the ALJ by reference to dictionary definitions, “detector” had a  
18 well-known meaning to those of skill in the electrical arts  
19 connotative of structure, including a rectifier or demodulator. No  
20 other extrinsic evidence, including the expert testimony, and no  
21 evidence intrinsic to the patent casts doubt on this conclusion.

22 Personalized Media, 161 F.3d at 704-705.

23 The court discussed the fact that the ALJ’s analysis centered around the  
24 ambiguity raised by the phrase “digital detector.” Personalized Media, 161 F.3d at  
25 705. The Federal Circuit found no ambiguity caused by this phrase, and in fact found  
26 that the term “digital” further narrowed the scope of detectors and made the term even  
27 more definite:

28

1 However, an adjectival qualification (“digital”) placed upon  
2 otherwise sufficiently definite structure (“detector”) does not make  
3 the sufficiency of that structure any less sufficient for purposes of  
4 § 112, P 6. Instead, it further narrows the scope of those structures  
5 covered by the claim and makes the term more definite. The use of  
6 the word “digital” in conjunction with the word “detector” merely  
7 places an additional functional constraint (extraction of digital  
8 information) on a structure (detector) otherwise adequately  
9 defined.

<sup>10</sup> Personalized Media, 161 F.3d at 705.

Having determined that the term “digital detector” is not construed under § 112, ¶ 6, the court next considered whether the term was indefinite. The court found that the term “digital detector” was definite, because the specification of the patent sufficiently defines the “digital detector” as a device. Personalized Media, 161 F.3d at 705-706 (“Here, the written description of the specification is sufficient to inform one skilled in the art of the meaning of the claim language “digital detector.” It explicitly defines a “digital detector” as a device that “acts to detect the digital signal information” in another stream of information.)

19 The Greenberg case is also on point. In Greenberg, the claim language was  
20 “detent mechanism defining cojoint rotation of said shafts.” The court found that,  
21 although the particular mechanism—“detent mechanism”—was defined in functional  
22 terms, this was insufficient to convert that claim element into a means-plus-function  
23 claim term. Greenberg, 91 F.3d at 1583. The court discussed the fact that, although  
24 many devices take their names from the functions that they perform, this is  
25 insufficient to “convert a claim element containing such a term” to a means-plus-  
26 function claim term:

27 First, the fact that a particular mechanism—here “detent  
28 mechanism”—is defined in functional terms is not sufficient to

1 convert a claim element containing that term into a “means for  
2 performing a specified function” within the meaning of section  
3 112(6). Many devices take their names from the functions they  
4 perform. The examples are innumerable, such as “filter,” “brake,”  
5 “clamp,” “screwdriver,” or “lock.” Indeed, several of the devices  
6 at issue in this case have names that describe their functions, such  
7 as “graspers,” “cutters,” and “suture applicators.” “Detent” (or its  
8 equivalent, “detent mechanism”) is just such a term. Dictionary  
9 definitions make clear that the noun “detent” denotes a type of  
10 device with a generally understood meaning in the mechanical arts,  
11 even though the definitions are expressed in functional terms.

12 Greenberg, 91 F.3d at 1583.

13 In Greenberg, it was not important that the term “detent” does not call to mind  
14 a single well-defined structure. It was enough that the term, as a name for a structure,  
15 has a reasonably well understood meaning in the art. Greenberg, 91 F.3d at 1583;  
16 Personalized Media, 161 F.3d at 705-06 (“Even though the term “detector” does not  
17 specifically evoke a particular structure, it does convey to one knowledgeable in the  
18 art a variety of structures known as ‘detectors.’”)

19                   **a) The Term “Encoder” is a Sufficient Recitation of  
20                   Structure to Avoid § 112, ¶ 6**

21 The claim terms at issue here are “identification encoder” and “sequence  
22 encoder.” Both claim terms use the word “encoder.” The term “means for” is not  
23 used. There is thus a presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply to these claim terms.

24 The term “encoder” has a well-known meaning to persons of skill in the art as  
25 connoting structure.

26 “Encoder” is defined in the IEEE Dictionary, Fifth Edition as structure: “1. a  
27 network or system in which only one input is excited at a time and each input  
28

1 produces a combination of outputs; 2. a device that performs encoding; 3. a device or  
2 system that encodes data.” (Exhibit 11 at p. 103 to Block Decl.).

3 “Encoder” is defined in the McGraw-Hill Electronics Dictionary, Fifth Edition  
4 (1994) as structure: “2. A circuit that performs repeated sampling, compression, and  
5 analog-to-digital conversion to convert an analog signal to a serial stream of pulse-  
6 code modulated (PCM) samples representing the analog signal.” (Exhibit 23 to Block  
7 Supp. Decl.).

8 “Encoder” is defined in the Dictionary of Computing, Third Edition (1990) as  
9 structure: “1. the means by which an encoding process is effected (see code). It may  
10 be implemented in hardware or software, the process being algorithmic in nature; 2. a  
11 logic circuit, usually an integrated circuit, that generates a unique n-bit binary word,  
12 indicating which of its  $2^n$  input lines is active, i.e., at logic 1. A keyboard encoder, for  
13 example, may be required to generate a unique binary code indicating which key on  
14 the keyboard has been pressed. If two or more of the device inputs can be active  
15 simultaneously then a priority encoder is required, which usually encodes only the  
16 highest-order data input.”

17 Thus, the term “encoder” has a well-known meaning to those of skill in the art  
18 as connoting structure—encoders are defined in dictionaries as being embodied in a  
19 network, a system, a device, a circuit, hardware, software, a logic circuit, an  
20 integrated circuit, or a keyboard. See, Personalized Media, 161 F.3d at 704-05.

21 The fact that the term “encoder” may be defined in terms of its function is  
22 insufficient to show that the term “encoder” does not connote structure. See,  
23 Greenberg, 91 F.3d at 1583 (“Many devices take their name from the functions they  
24 perform.... Dictionary definitions make clear that the noun ‘detent’ denotes a type of  
25 device with a generally understood meaning in the mechanical arts, even though the  
26 definitions are expressed in functional terms.”); Personalized Media, 161 F.3d at 705  
27 (“Even though the term ‘detector’ does not specifically evoke a particular structure, it  
28

does convey to one knowledgeable in the art a variety of structures known as 'detectors.'")

**b) The Term “Identification Encoder” is Also Sufficient Structure**

Like the word “digital” in the “digital detector” in Personalized Media, the word “identification” in “identification encoder” is an adjectival qualification placed on otherwise sufficiently definite structure. The specification describes the “identification encoder” as an encoder which “gives a unique identification code to an item.” (‘702 patent, 6:31-35). The identification encoder also optionally logs details about the item (program notes), assigns the item a popularity code, maps item addresses to item names, and operates a program which updates a master item database. (‘702 patent, 6:34-39; 10:45-46; 10:52-58; 12:4-5). See, Personalized Media, 161 F.3d at 705-06 (“Here, the written description of the specification is sufficient to inform one skilled in the art of the meaning of the claim language ‘digital detector.’ It explicitly defines a ‘digital detector’ as a device that ‘acts to detect the digital signal information’ in another stream of information.”)

c) The term “Sequence Encoder” is Also Sufficient Structure

Although the term “sequence encoder” is not used in the specification of the ‘702 patent, the specification of the ‘702 patent is also sufficient to inform persons of skill in the art of the meaning of the term “sequence encoder” as structure. The specification discloses a time encoder, which functions to place blocks of converted format information from converter 113 into a group or sequence of addressable data blocks by assigning relative time markers to data prior to subsequent compression. (‘702 patent, 7:57-59; 8:6-9; 8:46-49; Fig. 2a). From this description in the specification, it is clear that the time encoder is a sequence encoder. Defendants

1 admit that the time encoder disclosed in the specification is sufficient structure.<sup>7</sup>  
2 (Defendants' Opening Brief at 29:17-20).

3 Thus, the terms "sequence encoder" and "identification encoder" connote  
4 sufficient structure, and the presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply cannot be  
5 overcome. These claim terms are therefore not construed pursuant to § 112, ¶ 6 and  
6 the Court does not have to determine whether the specification discloses sufficient  
7 structure.

8 **2. Defendants' Arguments That The Claim Terms Are Not  
9 Sufficient Structure Are Incorrect**

10 **a) Defendants Have Not Shown That The Term "Encoder"  
11 Does Not Connote Structure**

12 Defendants recite the definitions for "encoder" from the IEEE Dictionary, and  
13 argue that, because these definitions use the terms "device" and "system," the term  
14 "encoder" is "purely functional." (Defendants' Opening Brief at 15:1-8). It is  
15 irrelevant that the definition of the term "encoder" includes terms, such as "device"  
16 and "system," because those terms (device or system or the like) do not appear in the  
17 claims of the '702 patent. The claim term is "encoder," not "device" or "system."

18 Regardless, even if "encoder" is defined in functional terms, this is insufficient  
19 to convert the claim term into a means-plus-function term. As shown by the  
20 dictionary definitions, the term "encoder" is a type of device that is generally

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23 <sup>7</sup> Defendants' positions in their brief as to whether the disclosure in the  
24 specification is sufficient to connote structure are at odds. On the one hand,  
25 defendants contend that the time encoder is sufficient structure but, on the other hand  
26 contend that the identification encoder, as described in the specification, is not  
27 sufficient structure. The specification describes the identification encoder in at least  
28 as much detail as the time encoder and both are described in as least as much detail as  
was the "digital detector" in Personalized Media. See, Personalized Media, 161 F.3d  
at 705-06 ("Here, the written description of the specification is sufficient to inform  
one skilled in the art of the meaning of the claim language 'digital detector.' It  
explicitly defines a 'digital detector' as a device that 'acts to detect the digital signal  
information' in another stream of information.").

1 understood in the field of computers, communications, and electronics to be structure.  
2 See, Greenberg, 91 F.3d at 1583.

3 The term “encoder” connotes structure.

4 **b) Defendants Have Not Shown That “Identification  
5 Encoder” Does Not Connote Structure**

6 Defendants contend that the term “identification encoder” does not connote  
7 structure. Defendants argue, without any support, that “[t]he term ‘identification  
8 encoder’ does not have any meaning to those of skill in the art that connotes  
9 structure.” (Defendants’ Opening Brief at 14:1-2).

10 This statement is untrue. The term “identification encoder” has meaning to  
11 those of skill in the art which connotes structure. Many United States patents disclose  
12 structures called “identification encoders.” (Exhibits 24-27 to Block Supp. Decl.).<sup>8</sup>  
13 Defendants argue that such patents “employ the term ‘identification encoder’ in a  
14 purely functional fashion to encompass whatever structure is disclosed in the  
15 particular patent.” (Defendants’ Opening Brief at 14:14-17). In other words, the term  
16 “identification encoder” is used in these patents to connote structure. Thus, even  
17 according to defendants, those of skill in the art use the phrase “identification  
18 encoder” to connote structure.

19 Defendants further argue that a statement by the inventors during the  
20 prosecution of the ‘702 patent, when amending claim 1, somehow means that the  
21 identification encoder has a function, but no structure. (Defendants’ Opening Brief at  
22 15:23 - 17:2). During prosecution, the inventors added the phrase “wherein said  
23 identification encoder gives items in said compressed data library a unique  
24 identification code” to claim 1 and stated that this amendment was made to “more  
25 clearly define the function of the identification encoder.” (Exhibit GG at pp. 161, 165

26  
27 <sup>8</sup> Attached to the Block Supp. Decl. at Exhibit 24-27 are four U.S. patents  
28 4,425,754; 4,087,753; 4,994,916; 5,204,900, respectively, each of which describes  
structures called “identification encoders.” For the Court’s convenience, each  
reference to “identification encoder” in the patents is marked.